Ford says that the high level of mobile connectivity among Ukrainians and the notable absence of battle footage from smartphones and headsets, especially in the early stages of the war, suggest a Effective communication action may be underway. “Without a doubt, Ukrainians fear such images will reveal their tactics, techniques and processes,” said Ford. So the Ukrainians may simply be censoring themselves.
Social media and mobile platforms are also a factor for traditionally weaker military powers, like Ukraine, especially when it comes to coordinating intelligence gathering for targeted operations. target. “Targeting information is currently being exchanged online,” said Ford. “Successful killing was held on Telegram. Chatbots have been established, helping Ukrainians share target coordinates with their smartphones. Targeting does not involve complex military systems; it operates from civilian information infrastructure. ”
“The problem with public intelligence in a war like Ukraine is standardization of reporting,” says Ford. For example, “You want to be able to identify a vehicle, determine its geographic location, then map it based on any available signals or satellite imagery or other acquisition rules, combine it into actionable target information.”
According to Ford, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not only the first conventional war of the 21st century in Europe, but it is also the “most digitally connected war in history”. “If the Ukrainians can perform intelligence action faster than the Russians, they can use limited firepower from a distance, artillery, drones and maybe even missiles or air power alone.” effectively. The goal, therefore, is to find, repair, and finish off Russian forces faster than the Russians can do on their own. “
When Russia launched an all-out invasion in late February, WEthat is allyand Russia concluded that Ukraine’s forces were disproportionately disadvantaged to Putin’s historically brutal and brutal partner. US officials expect the country to fall in the next few days. However, despite the great success of the United States in predicting Russian intentions and plans and issuing warnings, American intelligence agencies have inaccurately assessed the prospects for Ukraine – the current topic of discussion. at of a internal assessment.
Ford suspects that in the face of an onslaught of Russian armed forces, the resilience of the Ukrainian military might even surprise the Ukrainian people themselves. However, misperceptions about the balance of expectations between strong and weak powers, coupled with strategic surprises, can be common in the information age. Before being acknowledged role of social media in promoting the Arab Spring or the reported importance of thumb movements in recent times counterintelligence failed—Telecommunications infrastructure, open source, and cheap and easily accessible consumer technology have impacted the parity calculation for state and non-state actors.
Indeed, it was the tremendous growth of worldwide telecommunications in the 1990s that enabled Al-Qaeda to launch successful covert military attacks on US soil on September 11, 2001. But first. those attacks, the US Department of Defense was unsuccessful. t drafted a net assessment of the military or intelligence capabilities of what was later described by the 9/11 Commission as “The most dangerous foreign enemy. “The concept was unthinkable then, but it is not now.
