ATHENS, Greece, May 25 (IPS) – Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has sparked a new introspection in the West. Several commentators, mostly from the US and UK, have laid out their latest plan: Germany is to blame for its decades-long policy of appeasing Russia. Really?
People like and dislike Germany. Usually for good reasons. Merkel’s successors have been tough on their management of the eurozone crisis, imposing a crippling austerity regime in the South. They prioritize Germany’s narrow economic interests when dealing with illiberal regimes, including an belligerent Turkey.
Germany pursued a similar policy with Russia, weaving a web of close economic ties. Since the turning point of 24 February, it has become clear that this policy has ceased to be effective. However, the sarcasm directed at Germany has gone too far in the extreme: ‘Putin’s useful fools’ was the dictum of a recent Politico Europe article about Germany’s leaders. The German president has been prevented from visiting Kyiv after being declared ideological. It all became out of hand.
Understanding the German point of view
Extreme criticisms of this kind aren’t just about Germany and its dealings with brutal leaders like Putin. It also talks about Europe’s role in the international system. And it went too far, for at least four reasons:
First, history.
After admitting the crimes of Nazism, Germany was re-established on new ground after 1945. No other country has considered historical guilt an integral part of its national consciousness.
One can dismiss it as a thing of the past, but leaving it blank is not, nor is it just an excuse.
Second, Ostpolitik.
The Social Democratic Party in Germany today has inherited Willy Brandt’s post-1960s doctrine of cooperation, dialogue and engagement with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. This policy, followed by every administration since, contributed to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the peaceful reunification of the two Germans.
As a member of NATO, Germany constantly played an active role in the containment of the Soviet bloc. But it supplemented this role with a more visionary open-door policy towards the Soviet Union. A wise policy has been vindicated.
Third, Realpolitik.
Undoubtedly, the connection between Putin’s commercial dealings with Russia has been commercially beneficial to Germany. Would anyone be surprised if a state chose to act in its own economic interests? And in fact, the mercantilism of an export-led German economy built on foreign trade often led German foreign policy to forge ties with authoritarian regimes.
Nord Stream 2 has made Germany completely dependent on Russian gas. However, the Scholz administration shut down the pipeline shortly after the invasion of Ukraine and moved to support all the heavy sanctions imposed, accepting the resulting economic losses.
But here’s the bottom line: If Europe’s main weapon in response to Putin’s aggression is economic sanctions, it’s the density of trade with Russia that makes sanctions so difficult. effective leverage capable of exerting real pressure.
Without these deals, Putin would have nothing to lose – sanctions would be completely meaningless! Economic interdependence gives Europe the power to implement a deterrent by escalating sanctions. Even if it can bear a good portion of their own costs.
Build bridges, not walls
There is nothing black and white about dealing long-term with a militaristic tyranny, an opponent who holds nuclear weapons. It requires a constant mix of incentives and punishments to encourage positive behavior, discourage negative actions, and respond directly to aggressive behavior; a toolkit that includes both join and block applied in alternating doses.
Germany’s logic in dealing with Russia is helping to maintain a balanced European foreign-policy mix that would otherwise have veered sharply toward Cold War hawks.
Fourth, Europe.
Peace in postwar Europe rested in large part on pragmatic restraint by the leaders, the domestication of nation-states, and the practice of mutually beneficial cooperation. The EU has historical success in building bridges, not walls. Of course, when things change, Europe (and Germany) will change their mind, Keynes paraphrased it.
The EU cannot and must not abandon its soft power doctrine; rather, it must complement it with hard power and defensive deterrence. But holding onto European leaders who have sought to entice Russia as a partner responsible for Putin’s war is worse than revisionism. It’s an obvious logical distortion.
This article was originally published on ekathimerini-com
George Pagoulatos is a professor at the Athens College of Economics and Business, a visiting professor at the European University and director-general of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
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